The Fabian Society
London
19th January 2008
Today I want to address what I believe is the central challenge facing the Labour Party between now and the next general election: to show that we are excited not exhausted by the prospect of a fourth term in government. Excited by our engagement with the changes going on in people’s lives; excited by the renewal of our ideology for a world that has changed; excited by the challenge of uniting the country around common values; and excited by our purpose as a government, putting power as well as wealth and opportunity in the hands of the many not the few.\
Three election victories raise the bar for a fourth. My view is simple. We will win if we end up offering more change as well as more experience than the Tories; and that requires a compelling political narrative that explains the modern world, has clear ideas about how to change it, and a culture of debate and engagement in our movement that is outward looking, self-critical and thirsty for change.
That is why this conference is important. The subjects we are due to discuss raise profound questions about ideas and ideology, and it is about ideas and ideology that I want to speak today.
The argument is this. We live in a world where despite repression and injustice there is a civilian surge – more people wanting and able to shape their own lives. But there is also more insecurity of a particular kind – global threats to life and livelihood. Progressives can speak to this condition – but only by fusing rather than choosing between social democratic commitment to social justice through collective action and radical liberal commitment to individual freedom in a market economy. This fusion can give new impulse to our domestic policy, and a new purpose to foreign policy.
This conference is called Change the World. Let’s start by understanding how it is already changing.
The left has talked a lot about the essence of globalization – a new interdependence born of rising flows of people, money, culture and trade across national boundaries. But we have not talked enough about its consequence – fundamental shifts in the distribution of power.
Power is shifting from West to East. It is shifting from the national to the international level. But there is a third shift – in the balance of power between government and people.
At the beginning of the American Revolution, Thomas Paine called on his fellow colonists to forge a new society where power was dispersed among the citizens. "Let the crown … be demolished," he urged, "and scattered among the people whose right it is."
Today Paine's world is coming into view. Around the world there is what I call a ‘civilian surge’. Born of the death of deference in the North and West, the collapse of communism in the East, the spread of democracy in the South. Everywhere it is the rise of the better educated and if not better educated better informed citizen who knows, in real time, about how other people, often far 3 away, live their lives; who is more distrustful of traditional sources of authority; who is yearning for greater freedom and power; who is more able through technology to produce and distribute information, more able to hold power to account.
This is not just a phenomenon in Britain, or in eastern Europe where democracies have been recently established. Horizons are rising everywhere. 200 million Chinese people learning English. There are more bloggers per head of population in Iran than any other country in the world. Monks in Burma are marching for democratic rights. Slum wellers in Kenya are revolting against the abuse of their democratic rights.
This civilian surge embodies the ideal of progressive politics, for what is progressive politics if not the desire to see more people as actors rather than spectators in life’s dramas?
But alongside the rising tide of human rights and democratic values there is the reality of growing insecurity. There are the local problems of crime and anti-social behaviour, personal angst caused by more fragile families and less permanent relationships, but the global threats of climate change, financial instability, and transnational terrorism are potent and invasive.
Freedom and security have always been the twin aims of progressive politics. The unique fact about the present time is that people feel more free but less secure.
If that is the shape of the world, how do we address it from a progressive standpoint?
The truth is that no political ideology has yet found the subatnce and language to address the unique mixture of empowerment and insecurity, opportunity and constraint, that people feel. The right is fatally conflicted, between yearning for order and the lure of free markets, between allegiance to the nation and the reality of international problems. Their head tells them that to win they have to pledge greater funding for public services, greater commitment to social justice and environmental action. But their heart is still wedded to rolling back the state and rejecting Europe.
The left has a different problem. Not incompatible principles but traditions that have never quite been reconciled. Both have their homes in the Labour Party, but neither has paid enough attention to the other.
There is the social democratic tradition. Social democrats start by asking what kind of society they want. Their goal is the equal or just distribution of resources. Their means of achieving it is through the state’s role in taxation, regulation, and service delivery. Social democracy teaches that we must focus on patterns of distribution, locally, nationally and internationally.
The social democratic tradition has great achievements to its credit in the UK, notably in health and welfare. But on its own traditional social democracy is not enough.
We need the second progressive tradition. It is not anti state but it is not statist. Radical liberal by name and instinct, its unit of analysis is the individual, not society. The goal is freedom and the flourishing of the individual. And the means of achieving it is through the plural distribution of power – through voluntary action, markets, and a decentralised state. It has a vibrant recent philosophical tradition in John Rawls, Michael Walzer and Amartya Sen. Its legacy is legislation for human rights and against discrimination.
To contrast these traditions, liberty and equality, is a ‘category mistake’. As Amartya Sen says: ‘Liberty is among the possible fields of application of equality, and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty.’
The radical liberal tradition can teach social democrats the importance of individual lives and stories in the overall pattern of the good society. It speaks to the civilian surge. The social democrat can teach the radical liberal that, without social justice, there is no freedom. It speaks to collective insecurity.
The only way for the centre-left to win in the 21st century is to merge the strengths of these two traditions. The civilian surge demands that we keep up with people’s aspirations for control; but insecurity demands that we renew our commitment to collective action.
This fusion of social democratic commitment to fairness and radical liberal commitment to pluralism as the engine of innovation produces an exciting agenda for domestic policy:
In foreign policy the agenda is even more far-reaching.
We are required to ask big questions about what we are willing to do to extend individual rights around the world – because the suppression of individual rights is a source of instability, and instability affects us all. Are we on the side of the civilian surge? Do we accept a responsibility to advance universal values? If so, how?
And we are also required to address the big questions about the distribution of goods and entitlements: the social democratic questions. How should responsibility be distributed for tackling climate change? How can we construct a trade deal that supports drive to end poverty, and enables Africa to mirror Asia’s convergence with richer countries? Who should have access to nuclear technology and what responsibilities come with those rights?
The answer to these questions comes down to governance. Governance within states is all our concern – because terrorism and conflict spill over beyond state boundaries. And international rules and institutions are in all our interests because there are global problems from which there is no escape.
There are four principles that I think are paramount.
First, that weak states need the support of the international community.
The debate about liberal interventionism did not start with Tony Blair’s ‘doctrine of international community’ in Chicago in 1999. In 1987 my colleague French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner authored a book “Devoir d’ingerence” – the obligation to intervene. But of course the obligation to intervene is not just military; in fact military intervention is the last resort; the tools of soft power and hard power are meant to complement each other.
In Afghanistan and in Iraq, our job is to help fledgling democratic institutions take root. It is in accord with our values that we do so, but it is also in our interests. But we need to learn the lessons of our own history as well as theirs in providing effective support:
Second, citizens in states where government power is unchecked need the aid of the international community.
There are 16000 Nato troops in Kosovo to protect the minority rights of the 90% Muslim population. There are observers in Pakistan to uphold democratic processes. There is no recognition of the Kenyan government because of electoral abuse. There are sanctions against Burma because of the suppression of democratic will.
Universal values are real and popular. They raise really hard questions about how they are spread, but let’s not be ashamed to talk about them. They are part of our tradition not a neocon invention.
Third, regional institutions are the pragmatic response to the difficulties of global governance.
That is our case for the EU. It will never be a superpower but it can be a model power – promoting security and prosperity within its borders, and projecting its values to problems beyond its borders. This is not the thin end of the federalist wedge; it is the starting point for addressing genuine global problems:
Europe is an opportunity not a threat to Britain, and an opportunity not a threat to progressive politics.
And fourth, the world needs global alliances and institutions to address global threats. On Monday in India the Prime Minister sets out our agenda for the reform of global institutions - for what Francis Fukyama calls ‘multi-multilateralism’, using each forum and institution for distinctive purposes but with shared principles.
The UN is has unique legitimacy and reach. It needs reform to achieve more of both. But it is not a monopoly player.
In the application of every one of these principles, there is a new dynamic. Not just states negotiating with states, but people and business exercising power in their own right. And there is a new dynamic for Britain too.
I know why we talked about being a bridge between Europe and America. Because they were talking past each other. But France and Germany now have good relations with America. That is good.
But bridge was never quite right. We have global assets. A global language. Global businesses and NGOs. And global networks. That is why I talk about Britain as a global hub, promoting our values and interests on the global stage. We are members of the EU. Our most important bilateral relationship is with the US. And in China and India our links with Europe and America help us do that.
The traditional paradigm of geopolitics was based on the balance of power between states. Success was calculated in terms of the relative power of nation-states not the rise in human welfare. Competition, power-politics, and brinksmanship were the tactics.
Some states still play that game; and so our foreign policy still needs to be able to engage, taking on bilateral challenges, and using our long term alliance of values with transatlantic and other partners as the basis for doing so.
But the truth is that there is a new paradigm of globalisation with its reality of shared interest and common problems. From climate change and health pandemics to financial stability, national security comes not at the expense of other nations but in parallel.
The challenge is find ways to cooperate rather than compete, mobilising collective action in a world where power is more dispersed between nations, businesses and people.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, foreign policy and progressive values were often uncomfortable partners. Interests predominated over values. The new context holds out huge opportunities for progressive politics.
The last time the forces of globalisation were in the ascent, in the late 19th century, the old forces of geopolitics returned to undermine progress. In the 21st century, we need to apply both the social democratic and liberal traditions to maximise the opportunities from globalisation and manage the risks. That is an exciting project, and one which can capture the imagination in the years ahead.