Member of Parliament for South Shields

Latest Speeches

FCO Leadership Conference

Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre,
London
4th March 2008

My speech today is about how we build an organisation fit for 2020. How we maintain our position as one of the best, if not the best diplomatic services in the world. The starting point must be to understand how the world is changing over the next decade.

Globalisation and interdependence already define our age. So familiar are they as concepts that they almost wash over us without arresting our attention. But the implications remain profound. Nations' fortunes are intertwined as never before. Their national interests are increasingly aligned. We cling to the notion of sovereignty, yet all the time we are interfering in each other's affairs. The shared interests between nations in financial stability, a stable climate, and nuclear non-proliferation drive our foreign policy.

But what we are only just starting to come to terms with the way in which globalisation is altering the global distribution of power. We are only just realising the extent to which it affects our ability to cooperate and address our shared challenges.

First, power is moving from west to east, with the integration of China and India into the world economy. In the 19th century version of globalisation, a gulf in wealth opened up between East and West. Twenty-first century globalisation is drawing them closer together. It is easy to overstate the scale and speed of this. In economic terms, and even more so in military terms, the US will have at least another generation as the global superpower. Nevertheless, this century may come to be known as the Asian century.

Second, power is moving downwards to citizens, in what I call a civilian surge. The spread of democracy is shifting power from the state to citizens. Free trade and new technology is shifting power from companies to citizens. Social software is enabling citizens to collaborate at scale and creating a global civil society that represents a powerful voice against oppression and vested interests. The shift in power is not all positive. Asymmetric warfare is challenging states monopoly of violence - the power of citizens to destroy has increased while the power of states to control has diminished.

Finally, power is moving upwards to continental and global institutions, from formal institutions like the EU, WTO and UN, to informal institutions that govern the internet. This partly reflects the rise of shared interests between nations and the need for rules to government flows of trade, carbon, and weapons. But it also reflects changing values and the primacy we place on human security and human freedom over traditional notions of sovereignty.

These changes matter profoundly to how we secure peace and prosperity in the coming decades. In our lifetimes, we have already gone from the Cold war bilpolar age where stability came from the balance between opposing forces, to the unipolar age where security has been provided by US strength. But in the future, where power is more fractured - upwards, downwards and across to the East - there is a risk of what Niall Ferguson has called an apolar age of disorder. Perhaps more than any single threat, the breakdown of the rules-based international system is the greatest risk we face in this period of transition. It will make collective action to address shared threats much more complex.

So what are the implications for the UK's foreign policy?

It is against this background that we have reexamined our strategic priorities. The conclusions we came to are that we need to make the distinction between different foreign office activities: the global network that provides a platform for all of government; service delivery to citizens and business; and the foreign office's policy goals

The global network is important. We have some 260 posts around the world - around twenty more than ten years ago. We cannot be everywhere, but a global network representing in each post the whole of HMG, under the leadership of the Head of Mission, is a vital part of our foreign policy posture for the future.

The services we provide are our daily public face. Through UKTI, through our consular services and through UK Visas, we deliver for thousands of people every day. Deliver well, and they think better of the FCO and of Britain.

The policy goals flow directly from our analysis of how the world is changing. The first three goals reflect our view of the shared interests that are the most important to the UK, and over which we believe we have the most leverage.

The fourth goal reflects the need to strengthen our international institutions to address the new realities of the distribution of power.

On each of the four priorities there are some central questions with which we need to grapple.

First, tackling nuclear proliferation and countering terrorism. In a world where an increasing number of countries are turning to nuclear power to secure their energy needs, we need to reinvigorate the vision of a nuclear weapons free world and cope with the risks of greater proliferation. On counter terrorism, we need to divide our enemies and prevent them dividing us.

Second, preventing and resolving conflict. Too many times, in the aftermath of mass atrocities, we've promised "never again". But in a world where so many states remain wedded to the principle of non-interference and the primacy of sovereignty, how do we make the responsibility to protect a reality, not a slogan? How can we work with weak and faltering states to prevent such atrocities in the first place?

On the transition to a high growth, low carbon economy there is increasing consensus around the science of climate change. The technologies exist or are emerging. The economics show that the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of greening our economies. And the policy tools exist to drive the transition - from carbon markets to regulation and taxation. But we are stuck in a debate about who should bear the costs of the transition - what we actually mean by 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. We need to move that debate on.

Fourth, the international system. In the twenty-first century, with economic and political power more dispersed, those who have relied on a bipolar balance of power, or have wanted to free-ride on US hegemony, will find themselves increasingly dependent on the multilateral system. So we need to strengthen these systems, and ensure that our shared rules and institutions better reflect the new shared threats we face, the increased influence of the emerging powers, and the rising demands of citizens worldwide for greater autonomy and accountability. There are, of course, fundamental questions about how we deliver such change; how we balance representativeness with effectiveness; how we persuade status-quo powers to accept a diluted role; and how we ensure that new structures are not based merely on realpolitik but on shared values.

To achieve these four policy goals, I believe we need to re-think the UK's role in the world, the assets we use, and reflect these changes in the foreign office's organizational culture, structures and ways of working.

Some have stated that the UK's role in recent years has been as a bridge between the US and Europe. I'm not sure the image of the UK as a bridge was ever right. It epitomised our ambivalent relationship with Europe, suggesting Europe was a bilateral relationship rather than an institution of which we are party. But with the rise of India, China and other emerging powers, the notion is even more inappropriate. I prefer to describe our role in the world as a global hub. Britain has strong links around the globe and, just as the City has become a global hub for finance, Britain should see itself as a global hub for diplomacy and ideas. This means maintaining our relationships with existing powers, but also deepening our alliances with emerging nations, and not just between governments, but between businesses, universities, cities and citizens. It also means developing a reputation as a hug for new ideas and solutions to global problems.

In our bilateral relationships, the US remains our most important ally. It is hard to imagine how the major challenges facing the world in the next decade can be addressed without US engagement. The importance of India and China is obvious in the coming decades. But on many issues, we need to look much further - so on Climate Change, South Africa, Japan, and Saudi Arabia will be crucial to getting an ambitious global deal. On counter-terrorism, Pakistan is a critical day-to-day partner. On a global trade deal, Europe needs Brazil's support.

But bilateral relationships must increasingly be used as a way of supporting multilateral action. Here I believe Europe has a particular role. Europe can help bridge that gap and play a leadership role - whether this on climate change and free trade or the Millennium Development Goals - the EU can chart a course for regional cooperation. Through its common action, it can add value to national effort, and develop shared values amidst differences of nationality and religion. While I do not believe the EU can be a superpower, it can be a model power, built on our shared commitment to democracy, law and human rights.

But alongside private diplomacy, we need to rethink the role of public diplomacy. In a world where power is more dispersed, between media, business and NGOs, and leaders are more fettered by external influence, we need to look outwards. Our global network, and London, need to focus not just on government relations but business, media and citizen relations. Sometimes we need to use public diplomacy to shape a debate and build consensus. At other times it may have a more disruptive role challenging conventional wisdom - witness the Stern Review on climate change.

So what does this mean for Foreign office itself?

The challenge for the foreign office is whether it can adapt to these major changes, while retaining the strengths that make it among the best, if not the best, diplomatic service in the world.

The traditional roles of the foreign office are still needed. Political reporting, sound analysis, and close contact with foreign governments will remain at the core of our work. We will continue to provide the platform overseas for other government departments, to be the hub for UK government activities in foreign countries. And just as important as policy is the work that we do to attract inward investment and support UK exporters, to help British nationals when they get into difficulty abroad and need assistance, and, through our visa and migration work to make sure the right people come here and the wrong ones don't. All of this will remain central to our aim and objectives for years to come.

But we need to adapt to external changes. Given the spread of global media and communications, we need to think about how best to use political reporting. In an age when, as the Prime Minister puts it, "over there, is over here", where every department is developing a foreign perspective, and where interaction with foreign governments can often be direct between ministers rather than via the diplomatic machinery, we must be clearer about our added value.

I believe our added value comes in three core competencies. First, we should understand foreign countries interests, power structures, and culture better than anyone else. Second, we should have unparalleled networks that enable us to influence a country's position from the bottom up as well as the top down. Third, while other departments focus on a single issue and have a single policy tool, the foreign office should have the overview of how to prosecute cross-governmental priorities. We should develop a global reputation for being the generator of new ideas to global problems. We should see ourselves as a central department, using our global network to interface between other countries.

To deliver the new strategy, we need to adapt who we are, where we work, and how we work.

First, if we aspire to represent modern Britain, the Foreign Office needs to look like it, from top to bottom. If we can achieve this, it will make the organisation stronger because creativity depends on having more diversity: not just in terms of ethnicity, age and disability, but diversity in terms of skills mix, experience and personality. Across the office, we need a better mix between people who are good at criticism and deconstruction, and those good at creative solutions and synthesis. We need to deepen both our country-specific knowledge, but also draw in different disciplines.

So if we are to deliver on our commitment to Afghanistan, we need far more Pashtun speakers. We need anthropologists who understand the tribal structures and relationships. We need a better economic analysis of Afghan drug markets. We need governance experts who understand how to build more effective local and provincial structures. And specialists need to be encouraged and empowered to be involved in developing policy, not just doing research.

Second, we need to change where we are. Our global footprint needs to keep pace with our new priorities. If we aspire to being a global hub, we also need to strengthen our presence in emerging powers, and in the critical countries that relate to our four new policy goals. That's why we've decided to move some of our policy staff out of Europe and into Asia, the Middle East and other parts of the world. This doesn't mean Europe matters less: it's where we live, and it will always be fundamental to British interests. It does mean that we can now operate differently there, exploiting travel and new technology, in ways we can't elsewhere. UKREP Brussels will remain one of our largest posts. We will maintain the Europe network. I applaud the spirit in which Heads of Mission in Europe have approached the need to scale down while delivering what's important.

The FCO's future footprint is likely to be heavier in the developing world and in some of the most far-flung, difficult and important places. One of our great strengths is being able to do what other parts of government can't, where they can't. We will need more than ever before to put our people into the parts of the world where others find it difficult or impossible to operate. That raises issues for families, and for our broader diversity goals, which we will need to face.

The nature of our presence will change too. We will still want the classic bricks and mortar Embassy in many places. But we will increasingly need to deploy staff away from our permanent fixed assets. We are already sending consular Rapid Deployment Teams to help Brits caught up in a terrorist attack or natural disaster, and laptop diplomats to hotspots like Eastern Congo.

Third, we also need to modernise how we work.

We must start by getting better at strategy. By this, I mean prioritising based on where our interests lie, and where we have the knowledge and leverage to achieve change. Setting ambitious but realistic goals. Understanding the different scenarios facing us, and ensuring we have a viable plan B. Calibrating whether our solutions are proportionate to the scale of the problem. Testing our policy ideas against the evidence base from comparable situations. Creating red-teams that challenge our assumptions.

Being strategic also means deploying the full range of tools - aid, trade, military capacity, and cultural diplomacy - to deliver our goals. If we are to do this, we need better integration, particularly between MoD, DfiD and FCO. I can set the lead, with regular trilaterals with Des Browne and Douglas Alexander. But we need to think more radically at joining up at all levels: from co-located staff at post to single cross-departmental country plans. To grow a different approach to strategic collaboration between departments, we are strengthening the policy planning staff into a foreign policy strategy unit that will draw in outside expertise and methods.

We also need to modernise our internal systems. The organisations that will thrive in the 21st century will be those that use knowledge better than their competitors. That's why I want advice direct from Ambassadors in the field, and I want to open up policy-making to outside experts and practitioners. That's why I want us to use new tools to map networks of power and influence so we understand how and where to intervene. That's why I welcome the arrival of our new IT system, F3G, and our new external web presence, FCOWeb, both of which begin rollout this month.

Finally, our culture and values need to evolve too. Great organisations are not just driven by interests. They are driven by a deeper sense of mission. If you ask me what drives my politics it is the desire to spread power, wealth and opportunity as widely as possible. Our world is increasingly scarred by inequalities and a deep sense of powerlessness. I believe the desire to spread power - through democratic government within states, and better cooperation between states - is the value base which runs through our work.

Empowerment must be embodied within the organisation. I believe in presumed competence. You decide what your posts will do and won't do, based on the Strategic Framework and the priorities of our Whitehall partners. You decide how to spend your devolved programme budgets in ways that support our priorities. You push responsibility down to the lowest appropriate level.

Conclusion

Since the decline of the British Empire, successive government have faced the choice: whether to retreat from the world, or to engage with the problems and opportunities beyond our borders.

Today, we see two futures played out in our international relations. A world of shared interests pursued through shared institutions, rules and norms. And a Westphalian world of power-politics and brinksmanship.

And we see two futures for the UK. One where we continue to look outward and to try to shape the world, building alliances to tackle the global problems we face. And a second where we withdraw, turn inward and limit our influence on the world in which we live.

At stake over the next decade is which of these futures wins out. There is no end of history. Globalisation is not an irresistible force. Like all human history, it is made and unmade by the actions of people.

The UK cannot afford to become a bystander. It has values and interests at stake, and unique assets to deploy. And with your help, this is what we must do in the years ahead.